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Abstract: The term “translational science” has recently become very popular with its usage appearing to be almost exclu-
sively related to medicine, in particular, the “translation” of biological knowledge into medical practice. Taking the per-
spective that translational science is somehow different than science and that sound science is grounded in an epistemol-
ogy developed over millennia, it seems imperative that the meaning of translational science be carefully examined, espe-
cially how the scientific epistemology manifests itself in translational science. This paper examines epistemological issues 
relating mainly to modeling in translational science, with a focus on optimal operator synthesis. It goes on to discuss the 
implications of epistemology on the nature of collaborations conducive to the translational investigative process. The phi-
losophical concepts are illustrated by considering intervention in gene regulatory networks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Google reports more than 100,000 results for "transla-
tional science." These include a host of institutes, centers, 
and programs, dealing exclusively with medicine – at least at 
the top of the hit list – although the phrase “translational 
science” itself does not imply any specific discipline. For the 
most part the phrase is used as if everyone somehow knows 
what it means, so that no definition is required. Given the 
fact that the term “science” is used everywhere to refer to 
activities and theories well outside the proper epistemologi-
cal domain of science, one can hardly expect a phrase based 
on the modification of the term “science” to possess a uni-
versal implicit meaning.  
  James Levine summarizes the situation when he writes,  
  What is translational research? Can I start dreaming of 
my children
  becoming translational researchers? The 
wonderful thing about
 translational research is that every 
one knows exactly what
  it means – the only trouble is 
that none of them have the
 same definition. One senior 
colleague told me that translational
 research ‘is to bring 
the gene from the laboratory to the bedside,’
 whereas an-
other colleague’s definition was ‘shifting science
 to the 
community – outreach they call it’ [1].
  
  This is not to say that efforts have not been made. For 
instance, Donna Johnstone makes a good attempt at provid-
ing a definition commensurate with a general view in the 
world of drug discovery: 
  What is translational science? This is a question I get 
asked frequently, by both academic and industrial scien-
tists trying to understand the ‘new kid on the block’ in 
terms of placement within a bioscience discipline. Rather 
than go through the well worked phrases of science that  
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  goes ‘from bench to bedside’ or from ‘mouse to man’, a 
more accurate definition might be ‘the application of 
biomedical research (pre-clinical and clinical), conducted 
to support drug development, which aids in the identifi-
cation of the appropriate patient for treatment (patient se-
lection), the correct dose and schedule to be tested in the 
clinic (dosing regimen) and the best disease in which to 
test a potential agent (disease segment)’ [2]. 
  While Johnstone succeeds in bringing focus on the appli-
cation, she does not address the scientific meaning of “trans-
lational science”. The goal is stated but not the implications 
of the enterprise being scientific.  
  The goal of translational science is clear: connect scien-
tific knowledge and the application of that knowledge. If 
translational science is be a meaningful endeavor, then the 
kind of knowledge represented by the connection must be 
understood. Moreover, to the extent that translational science 
refers to genomics, proteomics, and high-dimensional biol-
ogy in general, the ubiquitous epistemological shortcomings 
in these areas [3, 4] surely imply that it should receive care-
ful epistemological scrutiny.  
  This paper discusses epistemological issues relating to 
translational science and the manner in which epistemology 
affects the investigative process. The focus is on transla-
tional modeling, how it is a natural extension of scientific 
modeling with the added ingredient of purposeful action in 
the physical world, and how the demands of modeling shape 
translational research. The philosophical concepts are illus-
trated by considering intervention in gene regulatory net-
works. 
MODERN SCIENCE 
  Because the epistemology of translational science grows 
out of the scientific epistemology, of necessity we must be-
gin with the latter, albeit, briefly but hopefully sufficient to 
make the overall exposition self-contained (referring to [4, 5] Translational Science  Current Genomics, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2    103 
for those interested in an in-depth discussion relative to ge-
nomics and, more generally, to computational biology).  
  The great transformation of science, from the science of 
antiquity and the medieval period to the beginning of mod-
ern science, occurred in the Sixteenth Century when Galileo 
recognized the need for designed experiments – methodo-
logical as opposed to unplanned observation. Observations 
would be made under experimental constraint to elicit spe-
cific responses that would be integrated into a conceptual 
system. In The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Hans Reichen-
bach writes, “As long as we depend on the observation of 
occurrences not involving our assistance, the observable 
happenings are usually the product of so many factors that 
we cannot determine the contributions of each individual 
factor to the total result” [6]. Perhaps Immanuel Kant coined 
the perfect metaphor for pre-Galilean science when, in the 
preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
he wrote, “Reason must approach Nature… [as] a judge who 
compels witnesses to reply to those questions which he him-
self thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolu-
tion be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so 
many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into 
the path of certain progress” [7].  
  Knowledge can be obtained by groping in the dark, but 
groping lacks efficiency and what morsels are found are un-
likely to readily fit into a conceptual system. As Kant says, 
Nature should be probed with questions that the scientist 
“thinks fit to propose”. Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert 
Wiener state, “An experiment is a question. A precise answer 
is seldom obtained if the question is not precise; indeed, 
foolish answers – i.e., inconsistent, discrepant or irrelevant 
experimental results – are usually indicative of a foolish 
question” [8]. It is true that a scientific question might arise 
from the chance observation of some phenomenon that is 
inconsistent with existing theory, but once that inconsistency 
is observed, it is the scientist’s appreciation of the inconsis-
tency that leads to precise questions that must be addressed 
by experiments designed to elicit answers that lead to a 
reformulation of the theory in such a way as to rectify the 
inconsistency. But inconsistency is only one motivation for 
new experiments; another, and probably more prevalent one, 
is incompleteness. Here the scientist recognizes the existence 
of phenomena not accounted for by existing theory, specu-
lates on how the theory might be expanded to include these 
phenomena, and designs experiments targeted to achieve that 
expansion. This modern, post-Galilean approach to science 
is today often rejected in favor of a pre-Galilean groping in 
the dark, albeit, one enhanced by very fast high-performance 
groping called “data mining”, where conceptually driven 
experimentation is abandoned. Just increase the amount of 
data and some pattern will turn up! Indeed, clustering algo-
rithms form clusters. Classification rules form classifiers. 
But do the resulting clusters and classifiers embody scientific 
knowledge? [9] Post-Galilean experimental design is to pre-
Galilean groping as planned agriculture is to hunting and 
gathering.  
  Experiments drive the epistemology of science and the 
product of an experiment is a set of measurements. These 
form the empirical basis for knowledge. In themselves, 
measurements do not constitute scientific knowledge. Scien-
tific knowledge is constituted via systematic organization of 
the observed measurements, which are related to variables 
and relations among the variables. A system of variables and 
their relations forms a mathematical model. The model must 
be mathematical because it relates measurements via  nu-
merical structures or judgments via  logical constructs. A 
basic model may be formed by some set of relations, say a 
stochastic model of a gene regulatory network, but knowl-
edge does not stop there. Mathematical deduction leads to 
the full knowledge inherent in the relations. In Kantian ter-
minology, the mathematical model constitutes the object of 
our knowledge. The experiment and the mathematical model 
form two inseparable requirements for scientific knowledge. 
Either without the other cannot yield scientific knowledge. 
  A mathematical model alone does not constitute a scien-
tific theory. The model must be predictive. It must lead to 
experimental predictions in the sense that there are relations 
between model variables and observable phenomena such 
that experimental observations are in accord with the pre-
dicted values of corresponding model variables. There must 
be a predictive framework for validation because the scien-
tific truth, or validity, of the model depends on the accuracy 
of predictions arising from the model. This requires the con-
ceptual system to be related to the experimental methodol-
ogy. Reichenbach states, “The reference to verifiability is a 
necessary constituent of the theory of meaning. A sentence 
the truth of which cannot be determined from possible ob-
servations is meaningless… The verifiability theory of 
meaning is an indispensable part of scientific philosophy” 
[6]. Verification of a system requires that the symbols be tied 
to observations by some semantic rules that relate not neces-
sarily to the general principles of the mathematical model 
themselves but to conclusions drawn from the principles. In 
other words, the theory is checked by checking measurable 
consequences of the theory. These operational definitions, as 
they are called, are an intrinsic part of the theory, for without 
them there would be no connection between the principles 
and observation. There must be a well-defined procedure for 
relating the consequences of the equations to quantifiable 
observations, such as gene expression in the steady state of a 
gene regulatory network. A scientific theory must have two 
parts: a structural model and a set of operational definitions 
for its symbols. 
  Since a model can only be verified to the extent that its 
symbols can be tied to observations in a predictive frame-
work, limitations on the ability to design and perform ex-
periments engender limitations on the complexity of a the-
ory. In producing a verifiable theory, the theorist cannot ex-
ceed the experimentalist's ability to conceive and perform 
appropriate experiments, nor can the experimentalist produce 
directly meaningful experiments unless they are designed 
with a symbolic structure in mind. Mathematics alone is di-
vorced from the empirical basis of science, but without 
mathematics, meaningful experiments are impossible be-
cause scientific meaning is ultimately determined by a set of 
relationships between a mathematical system and experimen-
tal measurements. Indeed, because a model consists of 
mathematical relations and system variables must be checked 
against quantitative experimental observations, there is no 
nonmathematical way to describe the requirements and pro-
tocols to assess model validity. 104    Current Genomics, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2  Edward R. Dougherty 
TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCE 
  In discussing the meaning of translational science, we 
can turn to a definition in Webster’s Dictionary: to translate 
is “to change into another medium or form; as, translate 
ideas into action” [10]. Translational science transforms a 
scientific mathematical model, whose purpose is to provide a 
predictive conceptualization of some portion of the physical 
world, into a model characterizing human intervention (ac-
tion) in the physical world. Whereas the pure scientist typi-
cally tries to minimize human interference, translational sci-
ence extends science to include conceptualization of human-
originated action in the physical world and thereby raises 
epistemological issues relating to the knowledge of this in-
tentional intervention into the natural order. Scientific 
knowledge is translated into practical knowledge by expand-
ing a scientific system to include inputs that can be adjusted 
to affect the behavior of the system and outputs that can be 
used to monitor the effect of the external inputs and feed 
back information on how to adjust the inputs. 
  One must be careful in trying to make a crisp division 
between science and translational science. Scientific experi-
mentation is not a passive enterprise: Nature is probed ac-
cording to the plan of the scientist. The scientific enterprise 
is pragmatic in that its concept of truth depends on predic-
tions in the future, so that scientific knowledge is contingent, 
always open to refutation by new observations. Reichenbach 
writes, “Scientific philosophy has constructed a functional 
conception of knowledge, which regards knowledge as an 
instrument of prediction and for which sense observation is 
the only admissible criterion of nonempty truth” [6]. Trans-
lational science simply goes a step further. Its purpose is to 
characterize intentional intervention in the physical world for 
the purpose of attaining a desired end. Moreover, mathe-
matical models constitute translational scientific knowledge 
as well as scientific knowledge. Since any physical action 
upon a physical system brought about by human action must 
be understood in terms of measurements relating to those 
physical actions, such as the amount of electrical charge, the 
translational scientific model is itself a scientific model. In a 
sense, it is the purpose to which the model is put that deter-
mines its translational character. Arturo Rosenblueth and 
Norbert Wiener go so far as to make a universal claim of 
intention, and therefore a unification of science and transla-
tional science, when they write, “The intention and the result 
of a scientific inquiry is to obtain an understanding and a 
control of some part of the universe" [8]. For them, science 
and translational science are inextricably linked, the ultimate 
purpose of acquiring scientific knowledge being to translate 
that knowledge into action. The question is how that transla-
tion is to be accomplished. 
  If one is going to transform a physical process, then the 
conceptualization of that physical transformation takes the 
form of a mathematical operator on some mathematical sys-
tem, which itself is a scientific model for the state of nature 
absent the transformation. There are two basic operator prob-
lems concerning systems. The first is analysis: given a sys-
tem, S, and an operator, , what can we say about the prop-
erties of the output system, (S), in terms of the properties 
of  S? It might be mathematically difficult to characterize 
completely the output system given the complete input sys-
tem or we may only know certain properties of the input 
system, so that the best we can hope for is to characterize 
related properties of the output system.  
  For illustration purposes, consider a gene regulatory net-
work (GRN) operating in a constant environment. Here we 
assume that a GRN consists of a finite number of genes with 
various regulatory relations among them such that two con-
ditions are satisfied: (1) the state of the network, which con-
sists of the vector of all gene values, at time t depends only 
on gene values at time t  1, so that the state vector is dy-
namically described by a Markov chain; and (2) the Markov 
chain possesses a steady-state distribution characterizing the 
long-run dynamics of the network. If  is some structural 
operation on the GRN conceptualizing an action upon the 
structure (wiring) of the physical network, then a key prob-
lem for analysis is to characterize the steady-state distribu-
tion of the output network, (S), in terms of the mathemati-
cal representation of  and the steady-state distribution of 
the input network, S [11]. From a medical perspective,  
might correspond to the permanent blocking of a gene prod-
uct and the pragmatic translational issue might be to quantify 
the effect on the long-run survivability of the patient with 
intervention as opposed to without intervention.  
  The second basic operator problem is synthesis: given a 
system, we would like to design an operator to transform the 
system in some desirable manner. Unlike analysis, in synthe-
sis it is the design of the operator that is important. Whereas 
the purpose of science, absent translation, is to gain knowl-
edge of the natural world, translational science is about 
changing it, and synthesis is the act of designing operations 
to make those changes. It represents the critical act for hu-
man intervention and forms the existential basis of engineer-
ing. One could proceed in a trial-and-error manner, trying 
one operation after another and observing the result. In this 
case the operator is not constructed based on knowledge of 
the scientific system and synthesis is not part of translational 
science; rather, it is a form of groping in the dark, where one 
tries one operation after another in the hope of getting lucky, 
operator mining instead of data mining. Such groping in the 
dark does not preclude analysis, and therefore does not pre-
clude translational scientific knowledge; however, the criti-
cal engineering aspect, that being operator creation for the 
purpose of transforming nature, is not translational in the 
scientific sense.  
  For synthesis to properly occur within translational sci-
ence requires that synthesis begin with a mathematical the-
ory constituting the relevant scientific knowledge and the 
theory be utilized to arrive at an optimal (or close to optimal) 
operator for accomplishing the desired transformation under 
the constraints imposed by the circumstances. The classic 
example, the one commencing the era of modern engineer-
ing, involves optimal time series filtering in the classic work 
of Andrey Kolmogorov [12] and Norbert Wiener [13] (Al-
though [13] was published in 1949, an unpublished version 
appeared in 1942). One begins with a scientific model and 
expands the model by adjoining operators with which to de-
sirably alter the behavior of the original system. A criterion 
exists by which to judge the goodness of the response and 
the goal is to find an optimal way of manipulating the sys-
tem. In the classic Wiener-Kolmogorov theory, the scientific 
model is a signal and the translational problem is to linearly 
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some ideal (desired) signal. The synthesis problem is to find 
an optimal weighting function and the goodness criterion is 
the mean-square difference between the ideal and filtered 
signals. 
  Andrey Kolmogorov is generally considered the premier 
probabilist of the Twentieth Century; Norbert Wiener is gen-
erally considered the father of modern engineering – and 
here we mean engineering in the sense of translational sci-
ence, its more modern role, not in the sense of building de-
vices, its more historical role. The Romans were great engi-
neers but they were not translational scientists. Modern en-
gineering is mathematical engineering, applied mathematics 
with a driving translational purpose. Whereas the pure 
mathematician is motivated by internal mathematical ques-
tions, the applied mathematician develops mathematics for 
science or engineering. Both can be excellent mathemati-
cians; it is just that their domains are different – although 
there is certainly no clear line of demarcation between them. 
The theoretical physicist and theoretical biologist are of ne-
cessity practitioners of applied mathematics. Their expertise 
is quite different from the experimental physicist or experi-
mental biologist, who must design experiments to answer 
questions or validate hypotheses arising from theoretical 
speculation. All of these categories lie on a continuum; nev-
ertheless, they must be recognized because each contributes 
to scientific knowledge in its own way. Here, when the term 
“engineer” is used, it will refer to the modern mathematical 
engineer, our interest being in synthesis within translational 
science. 
 Synthesis  via  mathematical optimization within the 
framework of a scientific model does not mean that one can 
obtain a corresponding physical transformation, but it does 
provide both a target for physical design and a benchmark 
for performance. Vladimir Pugachev writes, 
  The theory of optimal operators does not enable opera-
tors to be found directly which can be embodied forth-
with in real constructions. It only enables those mathe-
matical operations on input signals to be determined for 
which the theoretical limit of accuracy is achieved, for 
given probability characteristics of the mode of operation 
and noise, having regard to the nature of the problem and 
the intrinsic properties of the available data. Accordingly, 
the practical value of the theory of optimal operators con-
sists mainly in the fact that it makes possible the deter-
mination of the theoretical optimum towards which the 
design engineer must strive in designing a real control 
system [14]. 
  Having conceptualized the translational problem and 
found an optimal solution within the mathematical formal-
ization of the problem, the scientist and mathematical engi-
neer can now turn to the technological design engineer to 
build a device that acts in the physical world in a manner 
corresponding to the optimal operator within the transla-
tional scientific model – or at least approximates to a satis-
factory degree the action of the optimal operator.  
INTERVENTION IN GENE REGULATORY NET-
WORKS  
  To illustrate synthesis in translational science, we con-
sider therapeutic intervention over time in a gene regulatory 
network. Given a GRN model, the translational problem is to 
arrive at a series of intervention decisions whose objective is 
to decrease the long-run likelihood of states favorable to 
pathological cell functionality. To accomplish this goal, the 
task of finding an effective intervention strategy has been 
formulated as a classical sequential decision making optimi-
zation [15]. Two kinds of costs contribute to measure the 
goodness of an intervention at any stage in the treatment 
process: (1) a cost that discriminates between the desirable 
and undesirable states of the system, and (2) a cost of inter-
vention that quantifies the negative effect of an intervention, 
say, drug treatment or chemotherapy. These are combined 
into a total cost per stage and the objective of the decision 
maker is to minimize the accumulated cost associated with 
the progression of the network. To wit, given the state of the 
network, an effective intervention strategy identifies which 
action to take so as to minimize the overall cost. The devised 
intervention strategy can be used as a therapeutic strategy 
that alters the dynamics of aberrant cells to reduce the long-
run likelihood of undesirable states favorable to the disease. 
  In this framework, the translational problem assumes the 
existence of an external regulator and a binary intervention 
input u(t) at each stage t. The value, 0 or 1, of the interven-
tion input u(t) specifies the action on a control gene. Treat-
ment alters the status of the control gene. If treatment is ap-
plied, u(t) = 1, then the state of the control gene is toggled; 
otherwise, the state of the control gene remains unchanged. 
Given the cost-per-stage function, the objective is to derive 
an optimal intervention strategy from among a class of al-
lowable strategies. Essentially, a strategy is a function that, 
at each stage, takes as input the current state (and perhaps the 
history) of the GRN and outputs a decision: u(t) = 0 or u(t) = 
1. The decision maker searches for an optimal strategy that 
minimizes the expected cost aggregated over the long-run 
progression of the GRN. These kinds of problems have a 
long history in control engineering [16, 17]. 
  We illustrate the kind of results one can obtain with an 
optimal GRN intervention strategy based on external control, 
where in this case the GRN is a probabilistic Boolean net-
work [18]. The intervention objective is based on a study in 
which experimentally increasing the levels of the Wnt5a 
protein secreted by a melanoma cell line via genetic engi-
neering methods directly altered the metastatic competence 
of that cell as measured by the standard in vitro assays for 
metastasis and in which an intervention that blocked the 
Wnt5a protein from activating its receptor, the use of an an-
tibody that binds the Wnt5a protein, substantially reduced 
Wnt5a's ability to induce a metastatic phenotype [19]. These 
observations suggest a control strategy that reduces the 
WNT5A gene's action in affecting biological regulation, be-
cause disruption of this influence could reduce the chance of 
a melanoma metastasizing, a desirable outcome. In [20], a 7-
gene network containing the genes WNT5A, pirin, S100P, 
RET1, MART1, HADHB and STC2 was considered. Desir-
able states were those in which WNT5A was down regu-
lated, the control gene was pirin, a cost function was defined 
to reflect the goal and the cost of intervention, and the opti-
mal long-run control strategy was derived by dynamic pro-
gramming optimization techniques. Fig. (1a) shows the 
original steady-state distribution of the GRN absent control 
and Fig. (1b) shows the steady-state distribution of the con-106    Current Genomics, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2  Edward R. Dougherty 
trolled network. We observe a marked decline in the unde-
sirable probability mass in the controlled network.  
  The classical intervention optimization just described has 
two drawbacks. First, it requires full knowledge of the 
Markov chain associated with the GRN and, second, the 
computational complexity of the optimization algorithm in-
creases exponentially with the number of genes in the model. 
From the estimation perspective, one should note that the 
control strategy has not been derived from the GRN model 
itself, but rather from the Markov chain derived from the 
model. Owing to the amount of data required, it is difficult to 
estimate the transition probability matrix determining the 
Markov chain, but it can be much more difficult to estimate 
the full GRN model. The Markov chain is a characteristic of 
the GRN that provides a partial description. Another charac-
teristic is the regulatory (connectivity) graph that shows the 
existence of regulatory relations among the genes but not the 
relations themselves. Both the estimation and computational 
impediments to the design of control strategies can be eased 
by utilizing only partial information regarding the model. 
The resulting policy is typically suboptimal from the per-
spective of the full model, but it may be all that is possible 
given the estimation and computational requirements of the 
full model. 
  One long-run policy, based on the mean first passage 
times of the network, is based on two motivations: (1) it is 
preferable to reach desirable states as early as possible; (2) it 
is preferable to leave undesirable states as early as possible 
[21]. Given a control gene, if without intervention a desir-
able state reaches the set of undesirable states on average 
faster than with intervention, then the decision is to intervene 
and force the trajectory of the model to continue from the 
new state resulting from flipping the value of the control 
gene. If with intervention an undesirable state reaches the set 
of desirable states on average faster than without interven-
tion, then again the decision is to intervene. These insights 
motivate the use of mean first passage times for designing 
intervention strategies. Given time-course measurements, it 
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Fig. (1). Steady-state distribution of GRN: (a) original network; (b) with intervention. Translational Science  Current Genomics, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2    107 
is not necessary to estimate the full GRN or even the associ-
ated Markov chain; one need only estimate the mean first 
passage times from each desirable state to the set of undesir-
able states and, vice versa, from each undesirable state to the 
set of desirable states. These mean first passage times consti-
tute the required network characteristics for the algorithm 
and only they are estimated, thereby greatly reducing the 
estimation problem. In addition, the computational problem 
is mitigated because one need not use a complex dynamic 
programming algorithm to solve the full optimization rela-
tive to a cost function. 
  If we simply focus on the difficulty of inferring a full 
model, then there are two classic engineering approaches that 
can be employed; adaptive control [22] and robust control 
[23]. In adaptive control, the model and the control strategy 
are simultaneously estimated online as the data sequence is 
input into the adaptive algorithm. Not only does this avoid 
the need for full model estimation, it also allows the control-
ler to adapt to changes in the underlying physical processes 
that would perturb the model. With robust control, it is as-
sumed that the model, or the characteristic of the model be-
ing employed, is not known with certainty, so that the model 
is assumed to belong to an uncertainty class, and the control 
strategy is designed to take into account the performance 
across the entire uncertainty class. For instance, in the case 
of GRNs, robustness can be with respect to regulation or the 
effect of latent variables on the model [24]. Adaptive and 
robust methods result in control strategies that are subopti-
mal relative to optimization for the full model, but they often 
provide good performance when certain knowledge of the 
full model is not available. Whereas the scientist might not 
be satisfied with such uncertainty with regard to the scien-
tific model, the translational scientist has an application in 
mind and poses the problem in a way compatible with the 
state of partial knowledge. If the goal is curing patients, then 
the experimentalist needs to be guided by the engineer to 
design the kind of experiments that best support the transla-
tional goal and the engineer needs to be guided by the clini-
cian as to the kind of effects that the translational solution 
should provide.  
THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 
  The epistemology of translational science tends to place 
certain demands on the investigative process in order that it 
be successful, in particular, the nature of the complementary 
expertise and of the interaction among researchers from dif-
ferent backgrounds. While these have been worked out over 
many decades in the traditional engineering disciplines, such 
as electrical and mechanical engineering, they present chal-
lenging problems for medicine. Wiener recognized the diffi-
culties that the mathematical requirement of science and 
translational science would present for medicine when, in 
1948, he wrote the following words: 
  If a physiologist who knows no mathematics works to-
gether with a mathematician who knows no physiology, 
the one will be unable to state his problem in terms that 
the other can manipulate, and the second will be unable 
to put the answers in any form that the first can under-
stand. Dr. Rosenblueth has always insisted that a proper 
exploration of these blank spaces on the map of science 
could only be made by a team of scientists, each a spe-
cialist in his own field but each possessing a thoroughly 
sound and trained acquaintance with the fields of his 
neighbors; all in the habit of working together, of know-
ing one another's intellectual customs, and of recognizing 
the significance of a colleague's new suggestion before it 
has taken on a full formal expression. The mathematician 
need not have the skill to conduct a physiological ex-
periment, but he must have the skill to understand one, to 
criticize one, and to suggest one. The physiologist need 
not be able to prove a certain mathematical theorem, but 
he must be able to grasp its physiological significance 
and tell the mathematician for what he should look [25]. 
  Wiener’s statement provides an investigative framework 
for translational research. The GRN control synthesis prob-
lem previously discussed can be decomposed into several 
aspects: (1) construct the GRN: (2) define the optimization 
problem; (3) solve the optimization problem; and (4) physi-
cally implement the optimal therapy. One might argue that, 
unless a reliable model exists, the costs can be medically 
determined, and the optimal therapy implemented in treat-
ment, then posing and solving the optimization problem is of 
little benefit. On the contrary, the existence of a translational 
mathematical system can guide the scientist in building a 
model that can be fruitfully applied, the clinical researcher in 
studying costs and benefits that accrue from certain kinds of 
interventions, and the biological technologist in devising 
methods of intervention that can lead to improved patient 
care. Only within a conceptual framework and in collabora-
tion can the experimentalist, clinical researcher, and tech-
nologist ask the right questions and look to devise the right 
techniques. By providing the conceptual framework in the 
form of a mathematical model, engineering is the glue that 
holds all of this activity together. In a properly functioning 
relationship, the scientist does not hand the engineer a set of 
experimental data and ask the engineer to find something in 
it; to wit, the comment of Rosenblueth and Wiener that 
“foolish answers” result from imprecise questions. When 
there is a translational purpose, the overall enterprise must be 
guided by that purpose. 
  It is here that the purview of the (non-translational) scien-
tist and the translational scientist diverge. The scientist may 
be interested in finding many relationships between many 
variables; for instance, the goal might be to build fine-grain 
networks including as many genes and proteins as possible. 
In this sense, there is no end to the scientist’s endeavor; dis-
cover as many relationships among as many variables as 
possible so as to continue to build the system to be ever more 
encompassing. The purpose of the translational scientist is 
quite different. For translation, a critical issue is to form the 
conceptualization at the right level of abstraction. The model 
must be sufficiently complex to permit the translational 
problem to be formulated within it to a degree sufficient for 
the application at hand and it must be simple enough that the 
translational problem is not obscured by too much structure, 
the necessary parameters can be well enough estimated, and 
the optimization is mathematically and computationally trac-
table. The desire for simplicity drives much of the work of 
engineers: reduce (compress) the model to achieve tractabil-
ity while at the same time keeping sufficient information so 
that the resulting solution, while suboptimal from the per-108    Current Genomics, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2  Edward R. Dougherty 
spective of the full model, is still acceptable. One need only 
look at the great effort expended on image compression to 
recognize the importance of model reduction. A basic way of 
overcoming computational limitations when designing inter-
vention strategies on GRNs is to reduce the GRN model 
[26]. It is important for the success of the translational enter-
prise that there be tight interaction between the scientist and 
engineer when it comes to model complexity.  
  There can be many ways of formulating a mathematical 
model constituting the same scientific knowledge, but the 
right representation (mathematical formulation) can be cru-
cial both for recognizing how to pose the translational prob-
lem and for solving it. Many problems have stood unsolved 
for some time until someone discovers the appropriate trans-
formation of the system that puts it in a form more suitable 
to solution (sometimes very easily once the system is trans-
formed). One can hardly imagine signal processing without 
the use of Fourier series to represent signals. In addition to 
facilitating a mathematical solution, the proper formulation 
may pave the way for successful implementation of the 
physical system.  
  Perhaps the most striking aspect of Wiener’s comment is 
with regard to the nature of the collaboration implied by the 
interaction just described. The mathematician (engineer) 
must be an expert mathematician and possess the ability to 
criticize and suggest appropriate experiments. The scientist 
(physiologist) must be an expert scientist and be able to 
grasp the scientific significance of a mathematical proposi-
tion and guide the mathematician in the process of symbolic 
formalization. To form such partnerships is not easy. It takes 
great effort and the bringing together of scientists and engi-
neers with exceptional expertise and talent. Among the im-
pediments to the progress of translational science in the 
medical domain, Arthur Feldman includes, “a paucity of well-
trained multi- and inter-disciplinary investigative teams” [27]. 
It is important to understand Feldman’s comment in the light 
of Wiener’s 1948 statement, the key phrase being “investiga-
tive teams”. Neither Feldman nor Wiener is calling for multi-
disciplinary individuals. These would be neither expert sci-
entists, nor expert mathematicians. Wiener is not talking 
about having people with some smattering of scientific or 
mathematical knowledge; rather, “each is a specialist in his 
own field”. It does little good for a brilliant biologist to sur-
round himself with assistants possessing only superficial 
training in mathematics, nor for a first-rate engineer to work 
with any but the best biologists. Arturo Rosenblueth was a 
brilliant physiologist and he chose to work with the greatest 
mathematical engineer of the Twentieth Century. Together 
they produced seminal work in systems biology [28]. While 
in the past it may have been possible for a single individual 
to bring into one mind all the science and mathematics to 
make transformational progress at the frontier of knowledge 
– Isaac Newton being the prime example – there is just too 
much to know in contemporary science and mathematics. 
For instance, the ability to obtain biological data is growing 
at an enormous rate and a vast set of relations between genes 
and proteins far outstrips the ability of any single person to 
grasp any but a tiny subset. Biological systems are more 
complex and exhibit greater nonlinearity than the humanly 
designed systems of classical engineering, thereby requiring 
fundamental mathematical knowledge for modeling these 
systems. 
  Consider three basic problems of translational genomics: 
classification, clustering, and the control of regulatory net-
works. Classification is an old, non-intuitive, and difficult 
subject requiring a rigorous education in multivariate prob-
ability theory. Clustering concerns random labeled point 
sets, a much harder subject than multivariate probability the-
ory. The study of gene regulatory networks lies within the 
theory of stochastic nonlinear dynamical systems, one of the 
most difficult mathematical areas, and the difficulty only 
increases when one includes the theory of control. More 
generally, translational genomics, in particular, its roles in 
diagnosis and regulatory therapy, rests on several engineer-
ing disciplines: signal processing, communication theory, 
control theory, information theory, and pattern recognition. 
These are among the most difficult mathematical areas 
within engineering and, for the most part, they have histori-
cally resided within electrical engineering. None of this 
should be surprising. In 1948, Wiener wrote, “The group of 
scientists about Dr. Rosenblueth and myself had already be-
come aware of the essential unity of the set of problems cen-
tering about communication, control, and statistical mechan-
ics, whether in the machine or in living tissue” [25]. By 
1948, Wiener had become aware of the epistemological unity 
of systems and translational science concerning systems, be 
it electrical systems and communication theory or biological 
systems and medical theory. There is a key difference, how-
ever, between electrical and biological systems: whereas 
many classical electrical engineering problems are either 
linear or can be approximated by linear systems, biological 
systems are inherently nonlinear and therefore mathemati-
cally much more difficult. 
  Mathematical modeling is an epistemological require-
ment for both science and translational science and lack of 
mathematical rigor represents an epistemological failure. 
With regard to translational genomics, one need only briefly 
glance at the genomic classification literature and see the 
ubiquity of cross-validation error estimation in situations 
where such an error estimate has virtually no correlation with 
the true error to see the practical cost of inattention to sound 
epistemology [29]. Beneficial application – curing patients – 
demands sound epistemology; otherwise, physicians cannot 
be assured that the translational methods provided to them 
are sound.  
  On this note, let us close with two rhetorical questions to 
the translational scientist. If you are suffering from diffuse 
large B-cell lymphoma, would you leave your treatment in 
the hands of a hospital technician or would you go to an ex-
pert in the treatment of lymphoma? But even prior to that, if 
you go to your physician for a diagnosis, would you want the 
proteomic classifier he or she is using to have been designed 
by someone who has taken one course in pattern recognition 
or by an expert who understands the fundamental theory and 
conundrums of a subject whose correct understanding often 
requires the overcoming of ordinary intuition? 
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